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LIST OF PARTIES
The parties to this action are:
1.

Utah State Retirement Board, Plaintiff and Appellant.

2.

Badi Mahmood, Defendant and Respondent.

3.

Irene Woodside, Defendant.

A default judgment was

entered against Ms. Woodside on September 23, 1987. (R. 294-295)
4.

Dale Jackman, Defendant.

Mr. Jackman was dismissed

by Stipulation of the parties and Order of the District Court on
March 11, 1987. (R. 148)
5. Bara Investment Corporation, Defendant. Bara
Investment Corporation was dismissed by Stipulation of the parties
and Order of the District Court on April 4, 1986. (R. 175-177)
6.
Respondent.

National Housing and Finance Syndicate, Defendant and
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT MAHMOOD
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to
the

provisions

of

78-2-2(3)(i)

Utah

Code

Annotated,

1953 as

amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in granting Defendant

Mahmood's Motion for Summary Judgment.
2.

Whether the trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's

Motion to File a Second Amended Complaint in light of the court's
ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed suit on December 11, 1985, against the
named

Defendants

in

five

separate

counts

based

theories of fraud and misrepresentation. (R. 2-11)

upon

various

Thereafter, the
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Defendants Barra and Jackman were dismissed from the suit upon
Motion of the Plaintiff and order of the court. (R. 15-11,
152)

R. 148-

Plaintiff moved to amend its Complaint for the second time on

April 8, 1987, (R. 155-170) , and after the filing of various
motions and memorandums, the trial court entertained a Motion for
Summary Judgment and Opposition

to Plaintiff's Motion to File

Second Amended Complaint. (R. 172-178, R. 269)
After having taken the Motion for Summary Judgment under
consideration, the trial court rendered its decision on May 13,
1987, granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendant National
Housing, which ruling is set forth in the Minute Entry, (R. 269),
and Judgment of the Court. (R. 272-275)

Subsequently, Plaintiff

and the Defendant Mahmood, by and through their respective counsel,
stipulated to summary judgment in favor of the Defendant Mahmood as
set forth in the Order of the court. (R. 272-275)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about December 18, 1979, an Earnest Money Agreement
was executed by the Plaintiff and the Defendant National Housing
and Finance Syndicate for the purchase of approximately 45 acres of
undeveloped land located in the southeast quadrent of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, for a total consideration of $927,819. (R.
229-230)
Prior

to

the

purchasing

of

the

land,

the

Plaintiff

requested an appraisal of the property by the Defendant Dale L.
Jackman, MAI, which appraisal revealed the fair market value

to be

the sum of $950,000 (Exhibit 1A, William Chipman deposition, R.
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180.)

Thereafter, approximately a year subsequent to the sale and

purchase date, the Plaintiff once again retained the services of
John K. Bushnell, MAI, to furnish an "updated" appraisal of the
subject property, which appraisal concluded the fair market value
of the subject property to be the sum of $929,600 (Exhibit IB,
William Chipman deposition, R. 181.)
Subsequent to the appraisal conducted by John K. Bushnell,
Salt Lake County adopted the "Salt Lake County Hillside Ordinance"
which

prohibited

the construction

of residential dwellings on

slopes of 40% or greater, which precluded a substantial portion of
the subject property from being developed
William Chipman deposition, R. 181.)

(Exhibit IE and IF,

In addition to the hillside

ordinance, real estate values in the Salt Lake County area have,
since the date of sale, declined substantially (Exhibits 1G - 1H,
William Chipman deposition, R. 181.)
claimed

At no time has the Plaintiff

that the original appraisal conducted by Dale Jackman

constituted fraud (Exhibit IB - 1L, William Chipman deposition, R.
181.)

As a matter of fact, the Plaintiff dismissed its claim

against the Defendant Dale Jackman

(Stipulation for Dismissal;

William Chipman deposition, page 44; R. 151-158.)
The only representations relied upon by the Plaintiff in
arriving at its decision to purchase the land in question were
those

contained

in

the

appraisal

submitted

by

Dale

Jackman

(deposition of Russell Hales, page 6; R. 182.)
In January, 1982, Plaintiff obtained an appraisal of the
subject property which indicated the fair market value to be the

-4-

sum of $510,000 (Exhibit ID, William Chipman deposition, R. 182.)
The Complaint in this action was filed on December 11, 1985; more
than three years after the procurement of the 1982 appraisal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

trial

memorandum

of

court

having

authorities,

before

pleadings,

it

and

the

depositions,

proposed

pleadings

concluded, as a matter of law, that the Plaintiff had failed to
present

any

evidence

that

a

cause

of

action

on

fraud

or

misrepresentation had been plead or could exist or that the alleged
conduct had demonstrated any fraudulent act or misrepresentation.
Therefore, the issue before this Court is whether or not the trial
court had abused its discretion in denying the Plaintiff's Motion
to amend its Complaint for the second time and determining, as a
matter

of

material

law,
issues

that
of

the
fact

Plaintiff
which

had

would

failed

preclude

to
the

present

any

granting

of

summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMITT ERROR IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT
MAHMOOD AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF.
An

analysis

"Appellant's

Brief"

of

the

tends

issues

to

raised

indicate

that

on

appeal

by

the

singular

the
issue

raised on appeal is whether or not the trial court erred in denying
the

Plaintiff's

However,

after

Motion
setting

to

file

forth

a

that

Second

Amended

proposition

or

Complaint.
issue,

the

Plaintiff then poses the issue of the statute of limitations and
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the additional issue of a breach of fiduciary obligation.

(Pages

1-2 of "Appellant's Brief".)
The principal objection posed by the Plaintiff is centered
around the "Sixth Cause of Action" contained in the proposed Second
Amended Complaint ("Appellant's Brief"f pages 11-12; R. 166-169.)
The allegations

of the original

Complaint,

(R. 2-10),

and the

allegations of the Amended Complaint, (R. 80-89), appear to contain
the same identical claims of misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary
obligation, mistake, and a general mish

mash

of assertions no

different than those posed in the Second Amended Complaint.

The

only difference appears to be a different label attached with no
new substantive issues plead or otherwise raised.
The
179-190),

thrust

of

the

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment,

(R.

focused upon the fact that the uncontroverted evidence

before the trial court at the time of the hearing disclosed the
following:
1.

Prior to the acquisition of the land by the Plaintiff,

an independent appraisal had been obtained by the Plaintiff
which disclosed the fair market value of the property in
question to be the sum of $950,000

(Exhibit 1A, William

Chipman deposition; page 6 of William Chipman deposition.)
2.

The Deputy Director and a member of the "Board" in

charge of acquiring properties for the Plaintiff testified
that prior to the acquisition of the property in question,
he inspected

the same

Mahmood and that no

in the presence of the Defendant

representation was made concerning the

value of same (Russell G. Hales deposition, page 5 ) .
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3.

The

appraisal

of

the

property

and

the

judgment

of

the

"Board"

were

the

independent

factors which controlled in arriving at a decision
relative to the purchase of the property (Russell
G. Hales deposition, page 6.)
Plaintiff concluded that the Defendant Jackman, who was the
original appraiser involved in the acquisition of the premises, had
not committed

any

fraud

and dismissed

Jackman

from the action,

(Stipulation of Dismissal, R. 150-151; William Chipman deposition,
page 44.)
In
testimony,

view
the

of
trial

the

pleadings, uncontroverted

court

properly

concluded

evidence, and

that no material

issue of fact existed and that summary judgment should be granted,
and further, that the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend its Complaint for
the second

time was

rendered moot under the circumstances, (R.

269-273-)
In matters of this nature, it has generally been recognized
that the ruling of the trial court will be sustained unless the
discretionary
See:

power vested

in the trial court has been abused.

Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P2d 1286 (Ut., 1976); Peatross v.

Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, 555 P2d 281 (Ut., 1976);
and, Westley

v. Farmer's

Insurance

Exchange, 663

P2d

93

(Ut.,

1983).
As noted in the case of Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P2d 360
(Ut., 1984), this Court held:
"Although Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, tends to
favor the granting of leave to amend, the matter remains in
the sound discretion of the trial court."

-7-

It is widely recognized that the trial court has discretion
to grant or deny the filing of an amended pleading and that when
justice so requires, motions seeking to obtain such filing should
be freely granted.

Girard v. Appleby, 660 P2d 245, 248 (Ut.,

1983); Thomas J. Peck and Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, Inc.,
515 P2d

446

(Ut., 1973);

Gillman v. Hansen, 486 P2d 1045 (Ut.,

1971).

However, in order to reverse the trial court's denial of

the Plaintiff's motion, it must first be determined that the trial
court abused its discretion or otherwise exercised its authority
outside of reason to the extent as to be capricious or arbitrary.
Westley v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, supra.
The proposed

Second Amended

Complaint considered

in the

light of the testimony elicited from the Plaintiff, taken together
with the appraisals and other pertinent data, clearly

indicates

that said amendment would, in any event, be futile and would not
survive a motion

to dismiss, and

therefore, the discretion and

authority exercised by the trial court was entirely proper under
the circumstances.
A comparison of the contents of the proposed Second Amended
Complaint, with

the prior

pleadings, clearly

shows that no new

issues have been raised and that the amendment of the pleading, if
allowed, would be futile.

It has been generally recognized that

where a proposed amendment would be futile, the trial court may,
within its discretion, deny a motion to amend such pleadings, or
where the filing of such a proposed amendment would be frivolous or
subject to a motion of dismissal, the court may exercise its sound
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discretion and deny the same.

See: Bache Halsey Stuart Shields v.

Tracy Collins Bank & Trust, 558 F. Supp. 1042, 1044 (D. Ut., 1983);
Conrad v. Imatani, 724 P2d 89 (Colo., 1986); Burt v. Blue Shield of
Southwest Ohio, 591 F. Suppl. 755 (S. D. Ohio, 1984).

DeRoburt v.

Gannett Co., 551 F. Supp. 973 (D. Hawaii 1982).
In the Sixth Cause of Action of the proposed Second Amended
Complaint,

(R.

166-169),

entitled

"Constructive

Fraud",

the

allegations contained therein merely embellish the allegations,
claims, and contentions as set forth in the original Complaint and
Amended Complaint, (R. 2-10, R. 80-89).
The Plaintiff had every opportunity at the hearing on the
Motion for Summary Judgment to present evidence, affidavits, or
other proof in support of its claim, but for whatever reason,
neglected to present any such evidence which would give rise to a
claimed issue of material fact.
As

noted

from

the

depositions

cited

herein

and

the

pleadings, the Plaintiff authorized Dale Jackman to conduct an
appraisal of the subject property as a condition to the purchase of
same,

(R. 180).

submitted

to

the

Further, the
Plaintiff

appraisal
and

by Mr. Jackman was

constituted

"the

only

representation" which the Board relied upon in arriving at its
decision to purchase the property

in question, (Deposition of

Russell G. Hales, page 6; R. 182.) In view of the foregoing, one
can readily understand why the Plaintiff was unable to present
counter affidavits or other evidence which would refute the basis
of the Motion for Summary Judgment.
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As

noted

hereinabove,

activities

prior

to

the

Mahmood1s

acquisition

participation

in

the

the

by

the

of

property

Plaintiff, as referred to hereinabove, was minimal, (Deposition of
Russell G. Hales, Page 5.)

At no place does the Plaintiff assert

or claim that the Defendant Mahmood made any misrepresentation of
value.
It has been generally recognized
value

of

property

are

generally

that statements of the

considered

as

declarations

of

opinion only and as such will not support an action for fraud, e.g.
Poison Co. v. Imperial Cattle Co., 624 P2d 993, (Mont., 1981); Page
Investment Co. v. Staley, 468 P2d 589, 591 (Ariz., 1970); 37 Am.
Jur.2d, Fraud and Deceit, Section 119 at 164.
In the case of Mackey v. Philzona Petroleum Co., 378 P2d 906
(Ariz.), it was held:
". . . . The accepted principle is that the power of
avoidance for fraud or misrepresentation is lost if the
injured party after having acquired knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the fraud, manifests to the other party an
intention to affirm or exercises domination of things,
restoration of which is a condition of his power of
avoidance."
In Page Investment Co., supra, it is cited:
"Actionable fraud must be based upon a misrepresentation of
material fact, and not upon an expression of opinion.
(Authorities cited.)
Here the alleged misrepresentation
was only that 'the property was worth $7,500.00 per acre.1
Such representation of value is generally simply a
statement of opinion and not actionable as fraud."
After

the expiration

of more

than a year following the

appraisal of the property by the Defendant Jackman, the Plaintiff
secured a second appraisal from another independent appraiser by
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the name of John K. Bushnell, who determined the fair market value
of the subject property to be $929,600, (R. 181).

It was only

after the property experienced a substantial decline in value that
the Plaintiff began to question the propriety of the purchase price
paid for the premises in question and chose to ignore the fact that
the compelling reasons for the decline in value were attributable
to the enactment of the Salt Lake County Hillside Ordinance and the
general decline in real estate values in the Salt Lake County area,
(R. 181).
Plaintiff's
allegations

totally

brief

is

replete

unsupported

by

the

with
record

bare
or

unsupported
any

credible

evidence or testimony, and in effect asks this Court to accept as
proven

fact

the

Plaintiff1s

version

of

what

they

believe

the

evidence would be.
In the case of Jardine v. Brunswick, 423 P2d 659 (Ut.,
1967), the Court stated:
"'Where one having a pecuniary interest in a transaction,
is in a superior position to know material facts, and
carelessly or negligently makes a false representation
concerning them, expecting the other party to rely and act
thereon, and the other party reasonably does so and suffers
loss in that transaction, the representor can be held
responsible if the other elements of fraud are also
present.'"
In applying the foregoing rule to the instant case, there
does not exist a scintilla of evidence to show that the Defendant
Mahmood made any false representation nor that the Plaintiff relied
in any respect upon any act or ommission of said Defendant.

To the

contrary, the Plaintiff elected to argue the merits of the Motion
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for Summary Judgment based upon the record at that time which
clearly indicated that the only two elements which influenced or
prompted the Plaintiff to purchase the property in question were
the appraisal of the Defendant Dale Jackman and the "judgment of
the Board".
To sustain a claim of constructive fraud, it is essential
that

a

confidential

relationship

is

a

prerequisite

to

the

establishment of same and such relationship arises where one party
having gained such trust and confidence of another has exercised
extraordinary
complained of.

influence

to

bring

about

the

damage

or

loss

See Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P2d 766 (Ut., 1985).

(See also Restatement of Torts, Second, Section 552.) In view of
the testimony of Russell G. Hales and William Chipman, supra, the
trial court, in our opinion, reached the only logical conclusion,
to wit:

"Plaintiff relied on the appraisal of Mr. Jackman who has

been dismissed as a Defendant.", (R. 269).
The evidence before the court at the hearing on the Motion
for Summary Judgment indicated the nature and extent of Mahmood's
participation to be that he had shown the property to the Plaintiff
prior to its acquistion, but had made no representations with
reference to its value, and beyond that point had taken no action
in or otherwise participated in the procurement of the appraisal or
the other deliberations conducted by the Plaintiff in arriving at a
decision to purchase and acquire the property in question, (Russell
G. Hales deposition, pages 5-6).
We respectfully submit that the claim of constructive fraud
requires the demonstration that extraordinary influences had been
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used

and

that

such

influences

have

been

a

substantial

and

controlling factor in causing the aggrieved party to act thereon
and to its detriment.
It has been noted that "a trial court judgment will not be
overturned if any theory within the pleadings and proof can support
it."

See: Setzer v. South Columbia Basin Irrigation District, 576

P2d 82 (Wash., 1978); Lundgren v. Kieren, 393 P2d 625 (Wash., 1964)
The Supreme Court of this State in the case of Franklin Financial
v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P2d 1040 (Ut., 1983), has
stated:
"Thus, when a party opposes a properly supported motion for
summary judgment and fails to file any responsive
affidavits or other evidentiary materials allowed by Rule
56(e), the trial court may properly conclude that there are
no genuine issues of fact unless the face of the movant's
affidavit affirmatively discloses the existence of such an
issue. Without such a showing, the Court need only decide
whether, on the basis of the applicable law, the moving
party is entitled to judgment. See Rule 56(c); Olwell v.
Clark, Utah, 658 P.2d 585 (1982); Lockhart Co. v. Anderson,
Utah, 646 P.2d 678 (1982)." See also: LaPlante v. State,
531 P2d 299 (Wash., 1975).
In the LaPlante case, supra, it has been noted:
"When a motion for summary judgment is supported by
evidentiary matter, the adverse party may not rest on mere
allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth specific
facts that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Upon

review

judgment, the

of

Supreme

the granting
Court

of

this

of

a motion

State

for summary

"applies

the same

standard as that applied by the trial court in determining the
existence of material fact."

See: Durham v. Margots, 571 P2d 1332

(Ut., 1977); also, Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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The depositions given by the Plaintiff's officers or agents
clearly indicate that the Defendant Mahmood made no representation
concerning the value of the property involved, and further, the
existence

of

the

Earnest

Money

Agreement

clearly

revealed

the

relationship of Mahmood as one of the "Sellers" involved in the
sale of the property

in question,

(Exhibit 3D, William Chipman

deposition and Russell G. Hales deposition, pages 5-6.)
The gravamen
Defendant

Mahmood

or

of

the Plaintiff's

the

real

estate

claim
agent

is not

that

the

involved

made

any

misrepresentation or concealment of any material fact which lead to
its

damage,

Defendant
reliance.

but

Jackman

rather
was

the

that

the

factor

appraisal
upon which

conducted
they

by

placed

the
their

Under those circumstances, we respectfully submit that

the allegations of constructive fraud or misrepresentation totally
fails and cannot be supported under any theory of the law.
CONCLUSION
Given

the

factual

background

and

the

posture

of

the

pleadings herein, we respectfully submit that the trial court acted
entirely within the perameters of its discretionary power and that
there has been no showing of an abuse of such authority and the
summary judgment granted should be affirmed.
DATED this

^ < T d a y of April, 1988.

^^Cttorngfy for Respondent Mahmood
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CERTIPICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copies of the
Brief of Respondent Mahmood were mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following named persons this / B ~ day of April, 1988.
Warren Patten
Mark L. Mathie
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Henry S. Nygaard
Craig T. Vincent
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah

84103

Mark A. Madsen
540 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

», A i yrtM xin M r / x / v ^

Sec^etaf^ t o Brant H. Wall

